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Public policy in vertically related markets: a Cournot oligopoly-oligopsony model
Marion Desquilbet - Hervé Guyomard
International trade in vertically related agricultural markets has already been the subject of
various studies, where competition at the processing level is modelled either as perfect (e.g.
Paarlberg, 1995), or as monopolistic competition (e.g.  Lanclos and  Hertel, 1996), or as
oligopolistic (e.g. McCorriston and Sheldon, 1996). In this paper, we argue that market power
may be exercised by the processing firms not only towards final consumers but also towards
primary agricultural producers, i.e. that it is relevant to consider an oligopsonistic-oligopolistic
structure.
In fact, the exercise of market power upstream by agri-food firms has probably not been a
major concern until now, at least in the European Union (EU), as it has certainly been limited
due to the existence of guaranteed prices on some bulk goods. However, the implementation
of the Uruguay Round GATT agreements now tends to reduce the support given to farmers by
means of guaranteed market prices, to the benefit of direct aids, and thus tends to diminish the
protection of farmers from oligopsonistic pressures - a direction that should be reinforced by
the forthcoming WTO negotiations.
The example of the cereals-poultry sectors in the EU has the main features of the framework
evoked above. Cereals account for one third of poultry total production costs, and poultry can
thus be considered as "processed cereals". The EU compound feed industry is concentrated,
with 15 groups of more that 3Mt representing around 30% of the production, and 50 groups
of more than 0.5Mt representing around 60% of the production (Janet and Roux, 1996). This
suggests that market power could be exercised by compound feed industries when buying
cereals. In the poultry industry, concentration is also high, with ten processors having a market
share of 33% in Europe and with mainly two groups, Bourgoin and Doux, being involved in
exports towards third countries (Dunn, 1997). This suggests imperfect competition behaviors2
on the poultry sales market. Thus, considering the activities of purchase of cereals / production
of poultry / slaughtering and processing of poultry as an unique integrated activity, our model
may be illustrated by the example of cereals - processed poultry, with imperfect competition
present at both ends, and with trade on both products.
In the paper, we use a partial equilibrium two-country two-good model, with vertically related
markets, one country exporting both goods towards the other. The sector producing the
intermediate good is in perfect competition and the sector producing the final good has a fixed
number of firms, in Cournot competition upstream and downstream. We consider the public
policy in the exporting country, and we assume that there is no intervention in the foreign
country. We assume that the government wishes to support primary agricultural income, and
we account for this in our model with a redistribution constraint stating that the revenue of the
agricultural sector must be at least equal to a target revenue. The government of the exporting
country seeks to maximize the national welfare, under this redistributive constraint, using price
policy instruments (i.e., production, consumption and export taxes/subsidies). Our objective is
then to characterize the results for optimal intervention using the targeting principle (Bhagwati,
1971), which specifies that the government should use instruments correcting each distortion
at its source.
The model has features of the "strategic trade policy" models (Brander and Spencer, 1985),
where public intervention allows to shift the positive equilibrium rents on export markets to the
domestic firms. As it is well-known, the results for intervention in this literature are very
sensitive to the assumptions retained on the nature of the competition between firms (Eaton
and Grossman, 1986). However, the use of the targeting principle allows us to separate the
profit-shifting argument from the other rationales for intervention and to explain why the
government intervenes in order to correct the various distortions.
Equilibrium equations of the model3
The model is a partial equilibrium model with two countries, H and F, and two goods 1 and 2,
with good 1 being an intermediate input for the production of good 2. Country H exports
goods 1 and 2 towards country  F. In each country, good 1 is produced with perfect
competition, while there exists a fixed number of firms producing good 2, m (resp. m
*) firms
in country H (resp. F). These firms exert market power upstream (producers of good 1) and
downstream (final consumers of good 2). Thus, the processing firms of both countries compete
for the purchases of good 1 in country H and the sales of good 2 in country F ; the processing
firms of country H are in oligopolistic competition for selling good 2 in country H ; and the
processing firms of country F are in oligopsonistic competition for buying good 1 in country F.
The technology of production of good 2 is assumed Leontief with respect to good 1, one unit
of good 1 being used for the production of one unit of good 2. We consider the special case
where the firms adopt a Cournot behavior on the upstream and downstream markets where
they compete. Markets of goods 1 and 2 are assumed to be segmented (i.e., each firm sets its
quantities independently in both countries). The equilibrium results from a two-stage game: in
a first stage, the government of country H sets the level of the production, consumption and
export taxes/subsidies ; in a second stage, each firm chooses its levels of purchases/sales in
each market.
The producers of good 1 in country H are characterized by an inverse offer function  g S ( ) 1 ,
where S1 is the production of good 1. Their profit function is noted P
1
1 ( ) S . The derivative of
P
1 with respect to  S1 is then:  P
1
1 0 ' ' = > S g . The inverse demand function for good 2 in
country H is noted d D ( ) 2 , and the surplus function of consumers of good 2 is noted Yc D ( ) 2 ,
where  D2  is the consumption of good 2. The derivative of  Yc with respect to  D2 is then:
Yc D d ' ' = - > 2 0. Notations are similar in country F, denoting the variables with an asterisk.
The i
th firm producing good 2 in country H consumes a quantity  D
i
1  of good 1 and produces a4
quantity  S
i
2  of good 2, of which  D
i




th firm producing good 2 in country F consumes a total quantity  D
j
1
* of good 1, of which
X
j
1  is imported from country H and  S
j
1




good 2 entirely consumed in country F. From the assumption of Leontief technology, S D
i i
2 1 =
and  S D
j j
2 1
* * = . The definition of export offers and import demands and the equilibrium
conditions of the world markets of goods 1 and 2 lead to the identities:  S D X 1 1 1 = +  ;
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* * = +  ;  X D S 2 2 2 + =  ;  X S D 2 2 2 + =
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In country H, let  ps g S 1 1 = ( ) be the offer price of good 1,  pd1 the internal demand price for
good 1,  pd d D 2 2 = ( ) the final demand price for good 2,  psi2  the offer price of good 2 on the
internal market and  pse2  the offer price of good 2 in country F (these last two prices being
possibly different from the assumption of market segmentation). In country F, let  p1
* be the
offer price of good 1, equal to the demand price for good 1 produced in country  F,  pe1  the
demand price for good 1 produced in country H,  p d D 2 2
* * * ( ) =  the offer price of good 2 in F,
equal to the demand price for good 2 in F. The unit production, consumption and export
taxes/subsidies of good i in country H are called spi , sci  and sei  respectively (i =12 , ).
Section 3 and section 4 present the resolution of the second and the first stage of the game,
respectively.
Second stage of the game: determination of the equilibrium quantities
In the second stage of the game, the i
th firm 2 of country H maximizes its profit with respect to
its domestic sales,  D
i
2, and its exports,  X
i
2, taking as given the purchases of good 1 in H by




- , as well as the sales of good 2 in country F by the firms 2 of country F and by the other
firms 2 of country H, S2
* and  X
i
2
- , from the assumption of Cournot competition. The profit of
the i
th firm 2 in country H is:
(1) P P
2
2 2 2 1 2 2
2
2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2
i i i i i i i i i i D X S X D X D X S X D X D X ( , , , , , , , ) $ ( , , , , , )
* * - - - - = + + q h q h
with  ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ˆ





2 i i i i i i S C D X X D g X S X d D D d - + + - + + = P ,
q = + + + = - + - ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) sp sc sp sc ps pd psi pd 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 ,
h = + + + = - + - ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
* sp sc se sc ps pd pse p 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 ,
where  $ P
2i  is the profit net of budgetary transfers, (q h D X 2 2 + ) are the budgetary transfers,
and C S
i i
2 2 ( )  is the cost of the production factors except the cost of the intermediate good.
The two first order conditions of profit maximization are:
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2  are the partial derivatives of  $ P
2i  with respect to  D
i
2 and  X
i
2,
respectively, and where  ) ( 2 2 2
i i i S c c =  is the marginal cost of production.
These two first orders conditions indicate that in the absence of intervention (q h = = 0), the i
th
firm 2 of country H equalizes the perceived marginal revenue of its sales on the internal market
(i.e., the marginal revenue based on its Cournot behavior), d d D
i + ' 2 , as well as the perceived
marginal revenue of its export sales, d d X
i * *' + 2 , with its perceived marginal outlays,
g g D c
i i + + ' 1 2 . For the sales of good 2 on the internal market, optimality requires the
equalization of the price and the marginal cost of production, and thus the correction of two
distortions, i.e. the  oligopsonistic distortion upstream and the  oligopolistic distortion
downstream. For the sales of good 2 on the export market, optimality requires the equalization6
of the real marginal outlay (taking into account the adjustment of the sales of firms 2 of F as
well as the adjustment of the sales of the other firms 2 of country H) and of the production
costs, thus the correction of three distortions, i.e. the oligopsonistic distortion upstream, and
two distortions downstream: first, a "strategic distortion", because if acting as Stackelberg
leaders, the home firms could attain a higher profit level in the competition with the foreign
firms ; second, a terms of trade distortion, because each home firm 2 does not internalize the
effects of its output decisions on the price faced by the other home firms 2
i.
In the same way, the j
th firm 2 of country F maximizes its profit with respect to  S
j
1
* and  X
j
1 ,
taking as given the purchases of good 1 in H by the firms 2 of H and by the other firms 2 of F,
D1 and  X
j
1
- , the purchases of good 1 in country F by the other firms 2 of F,  S
j
1
- *, and the
sales of the firms 2 of H in F,  X2. The profit of the j
th firm 2 of F is:
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j j j S c c =  is the marginal cost of production.
These two first order conditions indicate that in the absence of intervention (x = 0), the j
th firm
2 of  F equalizes the perceived marginal revenue of its sales on the internal market,7
d d S
j * * * ' + 2 , with the perceived marginal outlay for imports of the intermediate good 1,
g g X c
j j + + '
*
1 2 , as well as with the perceived marginal outlay for local purchases of good 1,
g g S c
j j * * * * ' + + 1 2 . The introduction of  x < 0 leads to an increase in the perceived marginal
outlay for imports, from  g g X c
j j + + '
*
1 2  to  g g X c
j j + + - '
*
1 2 x . In other words, it leads to a


















2 * being equal to zero. Thus, the use of a negative x  allows country H to tax
the profit of the foreign firms 2 via their imports of good 1.
From the assumption of a Leontief technology and from the market equilibrium equations it
follows that  S S X 1 2 1
* * = -  and  D X D 1 2 2 = + . For a given level of intervention, the resolution
of the system formed by these two equations and equations (2), (3), (5) and (6) determines the
equilibrium level of D2 ,  X2,  X1, S2
*, S1
* and D1.
First stage of the game: determination of the level of the instruments
In the first stage of the game, the government chooses the level of the instruments q , h  and
x  in order to maximize the national welfare (equal to the sum of the surplus levels of the
producers of good 1, the m firms producing good 2 and the final consumers, less the cost of
intervention), under the constraint of a minimum revenue P
1 for the producers of good 1. The
lagrangean associated with this program is:
 (7)  L W = + - l( ) P P




c = + + -




where l is the multiplier of the redistributive constraint.
The solution for optimal intervention is found by totally differentiating this  lagrangean. A
convenient form for this total derivative is obtained using the two following relations. First,8
equation (5) implicitly defines  S S X X 2 2 2 1
* *( , ) = , where  S X 2 2
*  is negative and  S X 2 1
*  is positive
under the assumption of strategic substitutability between the purchases of good 1 and
between the sales of good 2 for the different firms (see annex). Second, equation (6) implicitly
defines  pe pe D X X 1 1 1 1 2 = ( , , ), where the partial derivatives  pe X 1 1  and  pe X 2 2  are negative
under the assumption of strategic substitutability, if  0 ". 1 > + X g g  and if the marginal cost is
non decreasing (c2 0
*'‡ ), and where  m X g pe D / ". 1 1 1 - = , which sign depends of the concavity
/convexity of the inverse offer function of good 1 in country  H  (see annex). Using these both
expressions, after rearrangement, yields:
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Assuming an interior solution is obtained, the optimal intervention is found by equating to zero
the partial derivatives of the lagrangean with respect to  D2,  X2 and  X1. This directly gives
the optimal levels of the instruments q ,  h  and  x . The interpretation is made easier by re-
writing the result in terms of optimal price differences. From equation (1),  ( ) ps pd 1 1 -
intervenes in the both expressions of q  and h , and thus there exists an infinity of solutions in
terms of price differences. This characteristic follows from the assumption of  Leontief
technology of production of good 2 with respect to good 1. From equations (1) and (4), the
optimal equilibrium can be obtained with the following price differences:
(9)  ps pd sp sc S g
m
D g X pe D 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
1 - = + = + + l ' '
(10)  ps pe sp se S g mS X pe X S
i
X 1 1 1 1 1 2
2
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* P
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The results can be interpreted using the targeting principle. Four kinds of distortions are
present here: the revenue redistribution towards primary producers ; the distortions resulting
from the market power exerted by the domestic firms 2 on their internal markets, upstream and
downstream ; the terms of trade distortion resulting from the excessive competition of the
domestic firms 2 on their export market ; and the "strategic" distortions resulting from the non-
competitive behavior of the foreign firms 2, upstream and downstream. According to the
targeting principle, if only price instruments are at disposal, the least-distorting way to
redistribute income towards producers of good 1 is a producer subsidy, sp S g 1 1 0 = > l ' .
The "strategic distortions" are of two kinds. First, in the presence of equilibrium oligopsony
rents partly captured by the importing foreign firms 2 on the market of the good 1 in country
H, country H can improve its terms of trade on this market
ii. Second, in the presence of an
oligopolistic rent on the foreign sales market of good 2, the home government can help the
domestic firms 2 increasing their net export profit. Each of these distortions require a
simultaneous intervention on the exports of both the primary and the processed goods.
Thus, the instrument on exports of the intermediate good,  se1, is used simultaneously to
improve the terms of trade on this market ( X pe X 1 1 1 0 < ) ; and to diminish the imports of good
1 by the foreign firms 2, in order to reduce their total production, and thus increase the






* P < ). The intervention thus
corresponds to an export tax on good 1, se1 0 < .
Assuming that the production subsidy  sp2 equals zero, the instrument on exports of the final
good, se2 , is the sum of three terms: a negative term of improvement of the terms of trade on
the market of good 1,  X pe X 1 1 2 0 < , aimed at increasing the sales price on the foreign market 2,10
and thereby increase the import price of intermediate good ; a positive term of correction of






* P > , aimed at increasing
the marginal export revenue of the domestic firms 2 ; a negative terms of trade correction on
market 2,  ( ) ' /
* m d X m - < 1 0 2 , intended to prevent the domestic firms from excessive
competition in the foreign market. The instrument used may be an export tax or a subsidy
depending on the relative values of these effects.
Still assuming that the production subsidy sp2 is equal to zero, the correction of the oligopoly
distortion on the internal market requires a consumption subsidy,  sc D d 2 2 0 = - > ' . The
instrument at the intermediate consumption of good 1,  sc1, is used simultaneously to correct
the oligopsony distortion (D g m 1 0 '/ > ) and to improve the terms of trade on the market of
good 1 ( X pe
D 1 1 1, which sign depends on the concavity/convexity of the internal offer curve of
good 1 in  H ). The sum of these two effects is necessarily positive if the offer function of
sector 1 in H is concave. It may be negative in case of strong convexity of this offer function.
Table 1 sums up the instruments used at the equilibrium of optimal intervention, in the case
where the production subsidy sp2 equals zero.
Insert table 1
Conclusion
The results obtained here may be compared with the case of perfect competition in a similar
context of vertically related markets. In this latter case, the optimal price policy consists in a
production subsidy on the primary good aimed at redistributing revenue towards its producers,
and export taxes on both goods aimed at improving the terms of trade in the large country
case. Integrating an  oligopolistic-oligopsonistic behavior of the processing firms in this
framework, we find that the production subsidy on the primary good is still the best way to
redistribute income towards its producers ; but intervention on the exports of both goods is11
now motivated by the strategic nature of the interaction between firms, and welfare
maximization also requires intervention on the internal home markets, mainly because of the
non-competitive behavior of the domestic firms. Thus this paper identifies new rationales for
intervention arising in a context of vertically related markets, when taking into account
imperfect competition.
However the signs of the instruments obtained here are specific to the assumption of Cournot
competition with marginal substitutability between purchases and between sales of the different
processing firms, segmented markets). Further research should investigate other assumptions
on the competitive structure (e.g. Bertrand behavior of firms, integrated markets).
Moreover, assuming that the processing firm of the importing country is able to exert market
power upstream and downstream may not be adequate in the countries importing agricultural
goods from the UE. It would be interesting to extend our framework to a three-country model,
where two countries showing imperfect competition in the processing sector would export
towards a third country with markets in perfect competition.
Annex
Totally differentiating equation (5), after rearrangement, yields  S S X X 2 2 2 1
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j j . From the
terminology of Bulow et al. (1985), the purchases of good 1 are strategic substitutes if the12
marginal profitability of purchases of the intermediate good by each firm 2 decreases with the
purchases of the other firms 2:  0
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S X c S d d j j - + = P . These three expressions are negative under the previous
restrictions and as long as the marginal cost is non decreasing. Assuming also  0 ". 1 > + X g g
yields the signs given in the text for the partial derivatives of 
*
2 S  and  1 pe .
Table 1 : summing up of the instruments used
Optimal price differences ps pd 1 1 - ps pe 1 1 - psi pd 2 2 - pse pe 2 2 -
Instruments sc1 sp1 se1 sp1 sc2 se2
Improvement of the terms of trade on market 1 +/- - -
Correction of the oligopsony distortion exerted
by domestic firms 2 on the home market 1
+
Correction of the strategic distortion on the
foreign market 2
- +
Correction of the oligopoly distortion exerted
domestic firms 2 on the home market 2 +
Correction of the terms of trade distortion due
to the excessive competition between domestic
firms 2 on their export market 2
-
Redistributive constraint towards producers of
good 1
+ +
Total +/- - + + +/-
                                               
i Details for the oligopolistic case can be found in Krishna and Thursby, 1991.
ii See Cheng (1988) for a similar argument in the case of imports on an oligopoly market.13
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